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The Tragicomedy of the Commons
Brigham Daniels*
ABSTRACT
Scholarship on the commons focuses on a diverse set of problems,
ranging from crashing fisheries to crowded court dockets. Because we
find commons resources throughout our natural and cultural
environments, understanding old lessons and learning new ones about
the commons gives us leverage to address a wide range of problems.
Because the list of resources identified as commons resources continues to
grow, the importance of gleaning lessons about the commons will also
continue to grow.
That being said, while the resources that make up the commons
are certainly diverse, so too are the ways scholars depict it and the
challenges it faces. Consider, for example, how three of the most
prominent commons scholars capture the likeness of the commons:
Garrett Hardin, a celebrated ecologist who gave us the concept of the
tragedy of the commons, spoke of the commons as an all-out free-forall. Elinor Ostrom, a Nobel Prize winner and a world-renowned
political scientist, devoted much of her career to helping us
understand how to govern the commons to avoid tragic ends. She
showed us that in the commons we often find ways to keep our
consumption and that of others at bay. Ostrom also made famous a
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number of case studies that provide examples of where use of the
commons is sustainable for long periods of time, even centuries.
Carol Rose, a giant within legal academia, helped us see that
sometimes an additional user of the commons leads to positive rather
than negative ends. She explained that sometimes we face a comedy
of the commons, as opposed to a tragedy. In such a case, the challenge
of a commons is not imposing diets or trimming a guest list. Rather,
the challenge is drawing additional people into a commons feast.
Echoes of these characterizations of the commons are found
throughout the commons literature.
This Essay tries to unify these three stories that we tell and retell
about the commons. To do so, it focuses on the strands that bind these
stories together into a single narrative. Quite coincidentally, the
overarching theme of this larger narrative very much follows the
storyline of an extended tragicomedy. And, like any tragicomedy,
this narrative has two dominant strands. One strand is plagued
with challenges, most of which can be traced back to the internal
characteristics of the commons––the nature of the resource, the traits
of its users, the way the commons is governed, and the value placed
on the commons resource. The second strand is one of hope—that
through governance we can overcome these internal challenges and
this inertia. However, hope in this context is fragile. Fortunately,
even though the storyline is difficult to alter, the end of each
commons story is ours to write.
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INTRODUCTION
The commons is depicted in such different ways that even when
just considering the classic scholarship on the commons, we might
have the same reaction to the commons as the protagonist of Jane
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, Ms. Elizabeth Bennett, had to Mr.
Darcy on the night of the Netherfield Ball: “I hear such different
accounts of you as puzzle me exceedingly.” 1
Consider, for example, how three of the most prominent pieces
of scholarship on the commons capture the likeness of the commons:
Garrett Hardin, a celebrated ecologist who gave us the label for the
concept of the tragedy of the commons, warned us that where we
find a commons, we should be prepared for an all-out free-for-all. 2
Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom devoted much of her career to
helping us understand how resource managers and even consumers
of a commons might find ways to govern the commons to avoid
such a tragic end. She showed us that in the commons, we often find
ways to keep consumption at bay and made famous a number of case
studies where use of the commons is sustainable for long periods of
time, even centuries. 3 Carol Rose, a giant among legal academics,
helped us see that sometimes in the commons an additional user of
the commons leads to positive ends, rather than negative ends; the
commons is a place where we find not just classical tragedies, but
also comedies. 4 In such cases, we should not worry about managing
crowds, just attracting them; not imposing diets and a trimmed guest
list, just enticing as many people as possible to join a commons feast.
This Article tries to unify these stories we tell and retell to
describe the commons. To do so, it focuses on the strands that bind
together these different stories. Quite coincidentally, the overarching
theme of this narrative very much follows the storyline of an

1. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 81 (Bantam Classic ed. 1981).
2. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
3. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 88–102 (1990).
4. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986).
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extended tragicomedy. 5 And, like any tragicomedy, this narrative has
two dominant strands. The first is plagued with challenges, most of
which can be traced back to the internal characteristics of the
commons—the nature of the resource, the traits of its users, the
reasons the commons is valued, and the way it is governed. The
second strand is more hopeful—that through governance we can
overcome these challenges. This hope is fragile, however, because
very often it depends on not only building and sustaining
governance of the commons but also adapting commons governance
as circumstances change. While commons narratives are likely to find
both elements of tragedy and comedy, the ending of a commons
story is not predetermined at the outset and can change over time.
In Part I, this Article provides three brief character sketches of
the commons. Within this context, we explore tragedies of the
commons and comedies of the commons. This Part will also look at
well-governed commons.
In Part II, the remainder of this Article shows connections
between what we believe are comedies of the commons, wellgoverned commons, and tragedies of the commons. To this end, this
Article introduces four types of situations where commons problems
often lurk.
5. Perhaps it should come as no surprise given the tremendous success of both The
Tragedy of the Commons and The Comedy of the Commons that this Article is not the first to use
the concept of the tragicomedy of the commons. While there are a number of scholars that
have employed the term, two of them warrant our attention here. The well-known political
economist Professor Russell Roberts, currently the John and Jean De Nault Research Fellow at
the Hoover Institution, wrote a working paper in 1990 that used the term “tragicomedy of the
commons” in its title. Russell D. Roberts, The Tragicomedy of the Commons: Why Communities
Rationally Choose “Inefficient” Allocations of Shared Resources (working paper 1990), available
at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/5665/The%20Tragicomedy%20of%
20the%20commons%20why%20communities%20rationally%20chose%20inefficient%20allocations%
20of%20shared%20resources.pdf?sequence=1. In his article, Roberts introduces situations where
management of the commons benefits a subset of the community using a commons at the
expense of the larger community. In pursuing its benefit, the subset leaves additional gains in
wealth on the table that could be gained if more community members shared more broadly in
the commons. Id. at 12. Roberts calls this “inefficient” method of using the commons, which
he saw repeatedly, a tragicomedy. In another article, Professor Donald Elliott introduced what
he called a “tragi-comedy” of the commons. E. Donald Elliot, The Tragi-Comedy of the
Commons: Evolutionary Biology, Economics, and Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17
(2001). Elliot argues that human nature does not necessarily lead us to tragedies of the
commons, nor does it necessarily lead to comedies of the commons; it can lead to either,
neither, or both. Id. at 19–20. He shows that human nature is complex and that the predictive
models often employed in environmental law oversimplify the situation.
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I. OF HERDERS, SUN BATHERS, AND IRRIGATORS

This Part paints three different characterizations of the
commons. These characterizations come from arguably the three
most important works focused on the commons: Hardin’s Tragedy of
the Commons, Rose’s Comedy of the Commons, and Ostrom’s
Governing the Commons. Juxtaposing these three different depictions
of the commons not only provides an insight into the highly diverse
ways scholars have characterized the commons, but also provides a
backdrop that is necessary to understand the thesis of this Article:
these different depictions are best understood as highlighting
different aspects of the commons that require vigilance if we are to
stave off problems in the commons.
A. The Tragedy of the Commons
While others had previously identified the incentives that fuel the
tragedy of the commons, 6 Garrett Hardin’s work solidified the
consequences of these sorts of incentives as a class of problems. 7
Specifically, Hardin looked at resources that are characterized by the
following traits: first, when a user of the commons consumes part of
the commons, that user gets all of the benefit of that use; and
second, the cost of this consumption is shared across all potential
users. When resources had these traits and were not restricted,
Hardin saw the potential for a resource free-for-all—something that

6. Many others have made observations that are similar to those found in Hardin’s The
Tragedy of the Commons. Elinor Ostrom points out that what is known as the tragedy of the
commons even appeared in Aristotle’s writing. OSTROM, supra note 3, at 2–3 (citing
Aristotle’s Politics, which states, “what is common to the greatest number has the least care
bestowed on it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all the common interest.”). Some
of Hardin’s contemporaries made similar points to those of Hardin. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon,
The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 135
(1954) (“Wealth that is free for all is valued by none because he who is foolhardy enough to
wait for its proper time of use will only find that it has been taken by another.”); Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354 (1967) (“Suppose
that land is communally owned. . . . If a person seeks to maximize the value of his communal
rights, he will tend to overhunt and overwork the land because some of the costs of his doing
so are borne by others. The stock of game and the richness of the soil will be diminished
too quickly.”).
7. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 242 (2000) (“Hardin gave the problem a vivid and visceral
name that quickly captures our attention and tells us much of what we need to know.”).
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he called the tragedy of the commons. To make his point, Hardin told
a story about cattle grazers who had the option of adding more cows
to an open pasture, a commons. Each time a grazer added a cow to
the field, that grazer later brought the cow home for the slaughter,
whereas the pressure placed on the pasture by adding the cow was a
cost that was shared across all potential users of the commons. 8
By identifying a number of situations that had the same
incentives in place as his story of the grazers and then classifying
these situations as a particular sort of problem, Hardin brought an
unprecedented amount of attention to the commons and energized
scholars by challenging them to find ways to solve the tragedy of the
commons. Through this work, commentators have identified a host
of problems that are tragedies of the commons. This scholarship first
focused on the archetypal commons resources Hardin focused upon,
like crashing fisheries 9 and overproduction of oil fields. 10 Scholars
continue to find new ways to apply the tragedy of the commons.
Recent examples include overuse of asbestos 11 and the race among
states to hold the first presidential primary. 12
B. The Comedy of the Commons
Many scholars have studied the commons and, after rummaging
around for a bit, identified tragedies of the commons—Carol Rose
saw something quite different. Rather than finding that each
additional user of the commons gained at the expense of the crowd,
she identified a subset of cases where each additional user
contributed to the net benefit of the crowd. Given that what she

8. Hardin expressed these payoffs in terms of “utilities”—each herder received one
positive utility every time he added a cow and lost a fraction of one utility every time a cow was
added to the commons. Hardin, supra note 2, at 1244.
9. Rose, supra note 4, at 748 (“[O]verfishing was our initial metaphor for the ‘tragedy
of the commons.’”).
10. Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 914 n.32
(2004) (“Oil presents a tragedy of the commons to the extent that the total amount of oil
available for anyone’s use diminishes with overly speedy extraction, or to the extent such rapid
extraction ushers in other inefficiencies that reduce the total benefits to be gleaned from the
resource (such as private storage costs).”).
11. Francis E. McGovern, Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV.
1721 (2002).
12. Brigham Daniels, Governing the Presidential Nomination Commons, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 899 (2010).
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found was quite different from what Hardin told her to expect, she
called this situation the comedy of the commons:
In a sense, this is the reverse of the “tragedy of the commons”: it is
a “comedy of the commons,” as is so felicitously expressed in the
phrase, “the more the merrier.” Indeed, the real danger is that
individuals may “underinvest” in such activities, particularly at the
outset. No one, after all, wants to be the first on the dance floor,
and in general, individuals engaging in such activities cannot
capture for themselves the full value that their participation brings
to the entire group. Here indefinite numbers and expandability
take on a special flavor, relating not to negotiation costs, but to
what I call “interactive” activities, where increasing participation
enhances the value of the activity rather than diminishing it. This
quality is closely related to scale economies in industrial
production: the larger the investment, the higher the rate of return
per unit of investment. 13

If there is a story that speaks to the comedy of the commons, we
can find it at the beach. There are many elements of the beach that
present comedies of the commons: swimming is more fun with
friends, and beach volleyball and Frisbee require others. As Rose
noted, “Recreation is often carried on in a social setting, and
therefore it clearly improves with scale to some degree: one must
have a partner for chess, two teams for baseball, etc.” 14 But perhaps
the phenomenon can best be reduced to a simple insight (mine, not
Rose’s—much too tacky to be hers): for those who go to the beach
to strut their stuff, it requires others to be there to see said
stuff strutted.
While the comedy of the commons may owe some of its
intellectual genesis to the beach, the concept has increasingly
become associated with intellectual and cultural resources. 15
Certainly, libraries are at their best when they are used; Wikipedia

13. Rose, supra note 4, at 768 (footnote omitted).
14. Id. at 779.
15. Carol Rose, Surprising Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1257 (2014); see also Yochai
Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in the Market Economies,
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1499 (2013) (arguing that Rose’s Comedy of the Commons has been
“most extensively developed in work on the Internet and the role of the public domain in the
production of knowledge, information, culture, and innovation”).
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and open source software do not even exist without users coming
together to create them.
C. Governing the Commons
A number of social scientists have tried to shift our focus from
commons resources to the users of the commons and the ways in
which the commons is governed. The real jewel of this literature was
written roughly two decades after Hardin recounted the fictionalized
tragedy facing the herdsmen. Elinor Ostrom combed through the
empirical evidence and identified unifying principles that
characterized those cases where commons users overcame the
tragedy of the commons. In her preeminent work, Governing the
Commons, 16 she referred to these as “design principles of longenduring institutions.” 17 These principles are much admired: the
Nobel Committee cited these principles before any other aspect of
her work in justifying Ostrom’s recent receipt of the Nobel Prize; 18
fellow Nobel Laureate Douglass North puts so much faith in this
aspect of her work that he considers Ostrom’s design principles
commandments rather than principles. 19
While management systems that best embody Ostrom’s
principles could take different forms, an irrigation system in Spain is
a well-known example that she has provided. 20 Ostrom explains that
in parts of Spain, we find irrigation systems in defined areas, known

16. OSTROM, supra note 3.
17. Id. at 88–102.
18. See Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksbank
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009: Economic Governance 13 (Oct. 12,
2009),
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/
advanced-economicsciences2009.pdf. The very first sentence of the press release the Royal
Swedish Academy of Sciences provided to announce Ostrom’s receipt of the Nobel Prize reads,
“Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated how common property can be successfully managed by user
associations.” Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009: Press Release, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Oct. 12, 2009),
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/press.pdf. Certainly, this is a
reference to these design principles.
19. See Douglass C. North, Dealing with a Non-Ergodic World: Institutional Economics,
Property Rights, and the Global Environment, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 10 (1999).
20. Note that Ostrom also focuses on particular communal herders in Switzerland and
forest harvesters in Japan. OSTROM, supra note 3, at 61–69. She also provides an example of
an irrigation system in the Philippines, which she suspects can trace its roots to the Spanish
system. Id. at 82–88.
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as huertas. 21 She reports that these huertas have been around for at
least 550 years, and perhaps as many as 1000 years. 22 Up until the
past century, this water allocation system has worked in a number of
water basins without the benefit of dams and despite times of
extreme drought. 23 To give a bit of perspective, think how this water
allocation system was around before Columbus sailed under the
Spanish flag and before the Spanish Inquisition, and may have been
around at the time the Moors ruled Spain. This history covered
times of great droughts. 24 The huertas survived the industrial
revolution, the world wars, and still live on to this day.
Through these three different stories—that of the herders,
recreationalist on the beach, and the irrigation practices of the
huertas—we see very different characterizations of the commons.
These characterizations, while wildly different, are all about the
commons. The next part of this Article attempts to weave these
stories together.
II. TRAGICOMEDIES: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE COMMONS
In this Part, this Article sketches out connections between the
three characterizations of the commons discussed in Part I. These
interrelationships illustrate the difficulties in governing the commons
in a way that heads off problems in the commons in the long run.
This Part plays out the thesis of the Article—that the divergent
characterizations of the commons are all correct: in fact, we
simultaneously see comedy and tragedy and should expect to
continue to do so. These divergent views of the commons are not in
conflict but rather are threads of an interrelated narrative. And while
there is often inertia that slumps toward tragedy, this inertia is
not unstoppable.
This Part lays out four instances where positive and negative
futures of the commons coexist.

21. Id. at 69, 71.
22. Id. at 69.
23. Id. at 69–82.
24. Spanish Droughts Over Past 500 Years Reconstructed, SCIENCEDAILY (Jan. 2, 2009),
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/12/081217192739.htm (discussing severe drought
conditions at this time, particularly between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
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A. Unacknowledged Limits
The first type of situation that deserves our attention arises when
there is nothing stopping the free-for-all of the tragedy of the
commons, but the negative consequences of crowding have not
manifested themselves. This sort of situation is particularly prone to
occur where the robustness of a resource seems to far exceed
demand. In such a case, it may seem that we have a well-governed
commons or even a comedy of the commons, but a tragedy of the
commons is lurking in the shadows.
In his classic article The Economic Theory of a Common-Property
Resource: The Fishery, which served as an important precursor to The
Tragedy of the Commons, H. Scott Gordon explains:
During the latter part of the last century, the Scottish fisheries
biologist, W. C. MacIntosh, and the great Darwinian, T. H.
Huxley, argued strongly against all restrictive measures on the basis
of the inexhaustible nature of the fishery resources of the sea. As
Huxley put it in 1883: “The cod fishery, the herring fishery, the
pilchard fishery, the mackerel fishery, and probably all the great sea
fisheries, are inexhaustible: that is to say that nothing we do
seriously affects the number of fish. And any attempt to regulate
these fisheries seems consequently, from the nature of the case, to
be useless.” 25

It does not take much to see that MacIntosh and even the great
Darwinian Huxley missed the mark by some distance. Because
fisheries are crashing throughout the world, 26 it may be tempting to
dismiss this passage as nothing more than an example of antiquated
ignorance. That would be a mistake, however, because we are
continuously finding that we are exceeding the capacity of resources
that seemed beyond our ability to exhaust.
Take for example space, sometimes referred to as “the final
frontier.” 27 It is easy to think that space is a place where no one has
gone before, but more and more, rather than emptiness, we find

25. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery,
62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 126 (1954) (footnotes omitted).
26. See generally, SUZANNE IUDICELLO ET AL., FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE
ECONOMICS OF OVERFISHING (1999); MIKE WEBER, FROM ABUNDANCE TO SCARCITY: A
HISTORY OF U.S. MARINE FISHERIES POLICY (2002).
27. Star Trek: The Corbomite Maneuver (NBC television broadcast Nov. 10, 1966).
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conflict in space, and not just with Klingons and Sith lords either.
Consider, for instance, satellites in geostationary orbit traveling
directly above the equator. Because these satellites must be spaced,
there are only a limited number of orbital “slots” for satellites. We
find countries jockeying to secure a piece of the action; countries at
the equator have even attempted to assert their control over the
space above them. 28 Similarly, the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 also known as the
Space Liability Convention, along with the Outer Space Treaty of
1967, set out liability rules meant to resolve liability for accidents
and harm. The Convention was relied upon to arbitrate fault related
to the crash of the nuclear-powered Soviet satellite Cosmos 954. 30
There is no way around it; we are starting to see the closing of the
final frontier.
What all this points to is that crowding of the commons is what
matters and crowded is not an on-and-off switch, but a spectrum.
The crowdedness of a commons is an interaction between the
number of users of a commons and the consumptiveness of their
use. 31 The extent to which crowding matters depends on the
perceived robustness of the commons resource. 32
Returning to Rose’s depiction of the beach as a place where we
are apt to find comedies of the commons, part of what is going on
there is that beaches, generally speaking, are not so crowded that we
worry about crowding. That is not to say that beaches are never
crowded; they can be, and when they are, we start to see the tragedy
of the commons—no space for Frisbee, no place for laying out
towels, just wall-to-wall people getting in each other’s way.
However, this is not the general experience we have on beaches, and
when the costs of adding another person on the beach are negligible
(which is often the case), we might find that the added benefit of
another person on the beach will tend to outweigh those costs.

28. Current Documents: The Bogota Declaration, 6 J. SPACE L. 193 (1978).
29. Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 10 I.L.M. 965.
30. Joseph A. Burke, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects: Definition and Determination of Damages After the Cosmos 954 Incident, 8 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 255, 270–74 (1985).
31. Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515,
536 (2007).
32. Id.
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It is also important to note that when we see rapid shifts in the
number of users that access the commons or their ability to
consume, we might find ourselves quickly pushing up against a
tragedy of the commons in areas that we did not assume had
problems. As I have stated elsewhere,
[S]everal factors influence the number of users of a commons,
including the size of a population, technological change, levels of
wealth, and market demands. While these factors are selfexplanatory, importantly, increases in all of these factors tend to
increase strain on commons, yet there are some notable exceptions.
For example, technology can make it less costly to access the
commons (e.g., transportation improvements) or less costly to
exclude others (e.g., the barbed-wire fence). Likewise, wealth
might mean more consumption or the willingness to invest to
protect a commons. 33

Furthermore, “technology changes may increase or decrease the
consumptiveness of a use of a commons.” 34 Not far from my
hometown, Provo, is a huge open-pit mine, the Bingham Copper
Mine. The story of the rate of extraction of the mine is largely a
story of technology. The story began with a few miners, but once the
railroad came to the mine, many more miners came as well. 35 Over
time, technology made mining efforts more and more productive. I
remember visiting the mine when I was younger and standing beside
tires for mining trucks that were so large that my head barely
reached the rim of the tire. Some of the trucks in the mining fleet
today are almost thirty feet tall and more than fifty feet long, with a
hauling capacity of more than three hundred tons in a single load. 36
This progression of technology is responsible for transforming a
mountain into a pit so large that it can be seen from space. 37

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. For a brief history, which oddly omits reference to the mine’s incredible
environmental destruction, see Louis J. Cononelos & Philip F. Notarianni, Kennecott
Corporation,
http://www.uen.org/utah_history_encyclopedia/k/KENNECOTT_
CORPORATION.html.
36. KSL News: Building Kennecott’s Monster Dump Trucks, One Piece at a Time (KSL
TV television broadcast Nov. 13, 2012), available at http://www.ksl.com/?sid=22958177.
37. Bingham Canyon Mine, Utah: Image of the Day, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY (Oct.
22, 2007), http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=8144.
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B. Interconnected Commons

The second sort of problem we find in the commons is the
presence of complex connections that inevitably result in
externalities—even in very well-managed commons. Perhaps the best
way to illustrate this point is with a personal story.
A number of years ago, I took my family to Disneyland. My
favorite ride of the day was the ride leaving the parking lot. Don’t
get me wrong, we had a great time. But we left the park along with
tens of thousands of other people just as the park closed. As the
crowd made its way to the parking lot, I saw all the elements of
misery on the horizon: a long wait, exhausted kids, and a compact
car. In fact, I dreaded this scenario so much that in the past I had
stayed in one of the hotels across the street from Disneyland just to
avoid this very situation. Bracing for misery, we all raced to the car
and crammed in.
To my surprise, we were out of the parking lot within minutes.
The exuberance and thrills the rides had given my children all day
were all mine in that moment. It was not dumb luck either. I had
Disney engineers and planners to thank for my quick getaway.
Disney had built a masterpiece parking lot that allowed traffic to
easily flow out of the lot—all in a way that was completely painless
for the driver. Even though traffic picked up dramatically once we
had left the lot, I determined I would never again patronize the
hotels across from Disneyland. How could I resist the temptation to
stay at cheaper hotels further away, and then hop in the car to travel
to the paved parking paradise that beckoned me?
Often, when I am leaving a concert, a ballgame, or a crowded
shopping center’s lot, I think longingly about Disneyland’s parking
lot. Far too often I find myself stuck in traffic thinking that Disney’s
parking creation, if implemented widely, could revolutionize the
parking experience. I have told my students that Disney manages
potential congestion so well that—if properly understood—its
parking lot very well could be the envy of resource managers the
world over. After all, too much demand for resources is often a
central problem facing those managing not only parking lots but also
fisheries, rivers, public roads, radio bandwidth, and a myriad of other
high-demand commons resources. And the free-for-all that we often
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face in crowded parking lots is a textbook example of the tragedy of
the commons. 38
Disney seems to have avoided this tragedy. But still, Disney’s
management of its parking lot might be seen in a dimmer light. Its
creation of the greatest parking place on Earth seemingly adversely
affected the public and commercial infrastructure surrounding the
park. It seems likely that the reason we hit traffic congestion once
outside of the parking lot is that the public infrastructure was
designed to facilitate Disney’s parking as if traffic flowed like a spigot
and not a fire hose. Additionally, if patrons calculate the relative
values of staying near the park or further away, the restaurants,
hotels, and shops surrounding the park no longer have the allure
they had when people could be certain of the misery that awaited
them as they exited Disneyland. With this in mind, we might wonder
what sort of future this commercial district faces, particularly if this
area does not become a great deal more pedestrian-friendly and
walkable in order to convince patrons that cars are unnecessary once
they arrive.
Additionally, despite my periodic longing for the proliferation of
Disneyland-like parking lots, this might give some pause: if Disney’s
scheme were widely adopted, it might give people yet another
incentive to drive. It could reduce incentives to take the train or bus
and perhaps work to kill walkable shopping districts in favor of
megastores and malls. It might spell the end of downtowns across
the country—other than “downtowns” found in places like lovely
amusement parks that feature Main Street as a quirky blast from the
past where one can buy old-time candy and have pictures taken with
some sweaty teenager hidden inside a plush mouse costume.
Perhaps, it’s best to leave Disney’s parking magic to Disney’s
Magic Kingdom.
The stories that have made Disney into the children’s
propaganda behemoth that it is often strain for a moral ending.
Given this, we might ask, what sort of heavy-handed message might
we glean from this story about the commons? If there is a lesson to
be learned about the commons here, perhaps it as simple as this:
solving any particular tragedy of the commons does not mean our
work is done. After all, if an army of Disney’s engineers doing their
38. See Hardin, supra note 2, at 1245.
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best work at managing traffic leaves us both in awe of their successes
and worried about the implications of applying these same successes
more widely, we should proceed with our work on the commons
with more than a modicum of caution and humility.
Beyond this personal narrative, consider a couple of examples of
commons problems rooted in policy. When Congress passed the
Clean Air Act in 1970, it saw the problem of air pollution as mainly a
localized problem. 39 In other words, Los Angeles’s air pollution was
considered a problem for Los Angeles, but not a problem for
Phoenix. Many of the provisions eventually implemented in the Act
provided emitters of air pollution an incentive to reduce their impact
on local air quality. Some larger emitters of air pollution—
particularly coal-fired power plants—complied with Clean Air Act
regulations in a way probably not foreseen by Congress when it
passed the Act. Rather than reducing emissions, these larger emitters
converted localized air pollution into regional air pollution. 40 They
did this by building super-sized smoke stacks that pump pollution
higher into the atmosphere. While this practice relieved local air
pollution, it also substantially increased regional air pollution and its
associated problems, including acid rain. In fact, one of the principal
reasons regional air pollution became such a problem in the 1980s
was that the commons solution to localized air pollution provided in
the 1970 Clean Air Act overlooked regionalized pollution. 41 In
39. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Roelofs, United States-Canada Air Quality Agreement: A
Framework for Addressing Transboundary Air Pollution Problems, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 421,
435 (1993); R. James Steiner, The North American Acid Rain Problem: Applying International
Legal Principles Economically; Without Burdening Bilateral Relations, 12 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L.J. 1, 19 (1988). Note that Congress, while drafting the Clean Air Act, mainly
cited the need to decrease local air pollutants as one of the rationales behind the legislation.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 512 (2007). The EPA, however, argued (unsuccessfully)
that the Act should not apply to global pollutants, like greenhouse gases. Id. at 510–14. The
Supreme Court’s decision against the EPA in Massachusetts v. EPA had nothing to do with
whether the Court believed that Congress mainly concerned itself with local air pollution in
1970 and everything to do with the actual text of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 528.
40. See JOHN MCCORMICK, ACID EARTH: THE POLITICS OF ACID POLLUTION 73 (3d
ed. 1997) (“[A]cidifcation remains a problem in and downwind of the major industrialized
areas of . . . North America.”); Joseph MacD. Schwartz, On Doubting Thomas: Judicial
Compulsion and Other Controls of Transboundary Acid Rain, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
361, 400 (1987).
41. See Michael R. Bosse, George J. Mitchell: Maine’s Environmental Senator, 47 ME. L.
REV. 179, 197–212 (1995) (discussing the political and legislative history of the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments).

1361

04 DANIELS.FINAL 1347-1372V2DO NOT DELETE

2/2/2016 7:31 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2014

addition to aggravating regional air pollution, the political dynamic
associated with the Clean Air Act also created entrenched interests
with a stake in continuing to emit regional air pollution, making the
problem all the more difficult to address.
Consider a second example. The past two decades have seen an
explosion of wireless technologies that rely on radio bandwidth to
function. 42 These wireless devices include wireless laptops, cell
phones, GPS technologies, and even garage door openers. One
hurdle in getting wireless technologies on the market is the scarce
availability of radio spectrum due to generous licensure of the
spectrum to technological innovations of the past, particularly
broadcast radio. 43 It is important to recognize that the reason
broadcast radio holds so much of the spectrum is that the
government wanted order on the dial. To do that, it divided up the
scarce bandwidth. Before this was instituted, stations bled into each
other and listeners would jump around the dial to get a better signal.
As Justice Frankfurter said, “[W]ith everybody on the air, nobody
could be heard.” 44 Licenses issued in the past to meet yesterday’s
problems make dealing with the challenges of the present
more difficult.
C. Problems of Resources with Multiple Dimensions
The way that we usually conceive the commons is often overly
simplistic. 45 Let me justify this assertion with an illustrative story.
A few years ago, I attended a conference on the commons in
Cheltenham, England. Cheltenham sits at the edge of the
Cotswolds, a beautiful landscape of rolling hills. At the close of the

42. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001).
43. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 242
(2005) (discussing alternative regulatory schemes for radio bandwidth).
44. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
45. Daniels, supra note 31, at 521 (“Commons institutions are intentionally myopic.
The herdsmen looked at a field and saw a pasture; salmon fishers see rivers and oceans in terms
of salmon habitat; jurisdictions attempting to limit greenhouse gases look at forests as
greenhouse gas sinks; wilderness advocates see remote places as areas ‘where the earth and its
community of life are untrammeled by man.’”).
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conference, my spouse and I went on a field trip to see
the landscape.
While the nerd-factor for me that week was already through the
roof, the highlight of the field trip really pushed it up a notch when
we came upon an actual commons (an honest-to-goodness, real-life
commons!). My spouse did her best to restrain her eye rolling as I
tried not to jump out of my seat.
As the bus slowed down, we saw cows on the commons (there
were actual cows on the commons!). Beyond the cows, we saw
people on the commons in the distance. I blurted out as I stood out
of my seat, “Are those the herders?!” I was beyond giddy.
As the bus moved on and got closer to the people on the
commons, we realized that they were golfing. In a moment of
mental confusion, all I could think of was, “Why would herders
golf?! Wait. . . . These are not herders, these are golfers.” It was hard
to see it any other way. Golfers were right there . . . with the
cows . . . on the commons. I was surprised to say the least, but the
tour guide—witnessing my excitement followed by confusion—
explained it was really nothing out of the usual.
When Hardin introduced us to the commons, he set me up for
confusion. I blame him really. Hardin did not describe a field, he
asked us to “[p]icture a pasture open to all.” 46 There is a difference
between fields and pastures, even though a field has geographic
dimensions similar to those of a pasture. The main difference
between the two is that implicit in the idea of a pasture is the
assumption of a particular use—grazing animals. 47 Grazing happens
on the pasture, golfing on the green, and both—apparently—on a
commons in the Cotswolds.
While Hardin’s environmental storytelling is much celebrated
and helpful in getting Hardin’s point across, he tells the story
exclusively through the eyes of the herders, ignoring—as much of
the commons literature is apt to do—that there might be competing
uses of the field that will have to go unfilled because the herders laid
claim to the field. The commons literature is replete with suggestions

46. Hardin, supra note 2, at 1244 (emphasis added).
47. A field is defined as “a land area free of woodland, cities, and towns[,]” while a
pasture is defined as “grass or other plants grown for the feeding of grazing animals.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 845, 1653 (16th ed. 1986).
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about how the herders and other commons users may avoid the
tragedy of the commons. But we ignore other potential dimensions
of the field that others might find appealing: a place for golfers, a
space for picnickers, watershed managers, wildlife hunters, or
policymakers in search of a place to grow a forest as a greenhouse
gas sink.
Even when a resource does not have multiple uses associated
with it, it often has multiple dimensions. Even just focusing on
preserving air quality, we find that there are local, regional, and even
global dimensions to air resources. Furthermore, people value them
for different reasons and to different degrees. For some, their
concerns might be protecting forests from acid rain whereas others
are concerned about the impact of pollution on asthmatics. These
different dimensions of the commons frequently lead to connections
between tragedies of the commons, comedies of the commons, and
well-governed commons.
D. The Mistake of Assuming Something Is a Pure Public Good Resource
When we find resources that have elements of public good
resources, we are likely to also find comedy. The main difference
between a commons and a public good is that using a public good
does not consume or diminish the resource. 48 Very few goods
(perhaps none) are truly public goods, but frequent examples are
national defense 49 and information. 50 While there are certainly
resources that have public-good dimensions to them, there are no
resources where rivalry does not play some role, at least sometimes.
Because of this, pure public-good resources do not exist.
Where we find a resource with elements of a public good, it
captures our attention. The problem is that we might be tempted to
overlook aspects of the resource that, while perhaps with less allure,
are likely to be a source of problems. At the end of the day, the

48. See Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction, in LOCAL COMMONS AND
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND COOPERATION IN TWO DOMAINS 13
(Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995); Fennell, supra note 10, at 919.
49. See, e.g., Daphne Keller, A Gaudier Future That Almost Blinds the Eye, 52 DUKE L.J.
273, 321 (2002).
50. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 32 (2004).
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assertion that a resource cannot be consumed or be diminished is—
to use a highly technical term—hogwash.
The notion that an assumed public good is nonrivalrous falls
apart for a number of reasons. Sometimes this occurs because
resources have multiple dimensions, some of which look more like
public goods and others that look more like commons. 51 Take the
example of the gases in the Earth’s atmosphere that create the
greenhouse effect. Emissions of greenhouse gases have often been
characterized as a classic commons problem. 52 This makes sense
because as an individual adds greenhouse gases to the global
atmosphere, she experiences all the benefits associated with emitting
the gases but only bears a minuscule fraction of the costs. On the
other hand, gases in the global atmosphere are also a textbook
example of a public good. Greenhouse gases form a fairly uniform
blanket around the planet that warms the entire Earth. One person’s
experience of this additional warmth does nothing to diminish the
greenhouse effect.
Now, consider a recipe. It could be easily argued that this is a
textbook public good because no matter how many times it is
copied, it still remains undiminished for the owner. 53 Some aspects of
a recipe, however, can easily be diminished—such as the ability of a
person to make money off of a recipe—if it is broadly shared. 54 In
other words, we see that aspects of the tragedy of the commons
apply to recipes as well. In other work, I made the point this way:

51. See Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 48, at 14.
52. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 190 (2005); Richard B.
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039,
2099 (1993); Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: “Insuring” Against Global Warming, 86 AM.
J. INT’L L. 445, 461 (1992); Thompson, supra note 7, at 253.
53. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of
Intangible Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 692–93 (making this
claim and providing an interesting example that highlight some of the complexities related to
managing public goods).
54. Professor Moohr’s example, id., does not ignore these aspects of recipes but rather
couches them as part of difficulties of managing public good resources. This characterization is
arguably correct and certainly found in many other places when dealing with discussions of
knowledge resources. My sense is that what is going on here is less about the complexities of
dealing with public goods and more of a problem related commons resources.
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While it is a bit ridiculous, consider the example of the potential
value of the fried chicken recipe at the heart of a memorable speech
delivered by one of Mike Myers’ characters in So I Married an Axe
Murderer. The character could hardly contain his scorn as he
explained at Kentucky Fried Chicken that the Colonel “puts
addictive chemicals in his chicken, making you crave it fortnightly.”
Had the Colonel blabbed the recipe far and wide, when the craving
kicked in, getting out the fryer would be an alternative to paying a
visit to the Colonel. In reality of course, addictive chemical or not,
KFC goes to great lengths to keep the “Colonel’s Secret Recipe” a
secret, hiding away the recipe in a vault protected by various
motion detectors and surrounded by concrete. If the recipe got
out, every potential customer who opted not to buy his chicken
would illustrate for the Colonel the sting of rivalry. 55

For the Colonel, the resource of his recipe would be quite
diminished mainly because of the way he values it has commons
dimensions. There would certainly be those who would appreciate
the public good aspect of the recipe being exploited more—certainly
the father in So I Married an Axe Murderer would have: “Oh, I
hated the Colonel with his wee beady eyes, and that smug look on
his face. ‘Oh, you’re gonna buy my chicken! Ohhhhh!’” 56
Beyond the dual nature of public good resources, often when
commentators invoke the concept of public good resources, what
really is at play is a public good resource that is not currently facing a
lot of pressure from congestion. For example, one of the most
common examples of a public good is a highway without much
traffic. 57 At least at some level this makes sense: adding more traffic
to the highway might have little or no effect on other potential
users. Still, highways, and many other resources that serve as an
adequate proxy for public goods in many instances, are of course
prone to crowding. 58 Regardless, the major point here is clear:
focusing on the public good aspects of a resource while ignoring the
commons dimensions of that resource is done at our own peril.

55. Brigham Daniels, Legispedia, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 445, 451–52
(Brett M Frischmann et al. ed., 2014) (parenthesis and footnotes omitted).
56. SO I MARRIED AN AXE MURDERER (TriStar Pictures 1993).
57. Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS
AND CLUB GOODS 273–77 (2d ed. 1996).
58. Id.
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E. Tragic Institutions

Any scholar, resource manager, or commentator who concerns
herself with the future of a commons or the well-being of a group of
commons users would love to have a toolbox that helps ferret out
potential exposure to the tragedy of the commons along with tools
to address these weaknesses. This is exactly what the scholars who
have concerned themselves with synthesizing the volumes of case
studies on various commons have provided us—the most well-known
of these, of course, is Ostrom’s principles of long-enduring
institutions, 59 but similar compilations by others are also
quite useful. 60
While much effort by other scholars has gone into uncovering
these principles, these various compilations differ somewhat from
scholar to scholar. What seems quite useful, but is not currently
available in the literature, is to think about what—if anything—
unifies the principles that have been identified. It seems three
important threads bind these principles together.
First, many of the factors identified above can be seen as an
attempt to provide commons users a credible commitment that they
will reap future benefits for any sacrifices they make today. The role
of credible commitments has been noted to resolve a host of
problems in the commons 61 and society more generally. 62 The
purpose of credible commitments in the commons is an inducement:
we ask users of the commons to cut back and in return give a
promise that they specifically will benefit from their sacrifice. Within
this context, we might think about rules that clearly determine at the

59. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 88–102.
60. See JEAN-MARIE BALAND & JEAN-PHILIPPE PLATTEAU, HALTING DEGRADATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES: IS THERE A ROLE FOR RURAL COMMUNITIES? 243–45 (1996);
ROBERT WADE, VILLAGE REPUBLICS: THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
IN INDIA 215–16 (1988); Arun Agrawal, Common Property Institutions and Sustainable
Governance or Resources, 29 WORLD DEV. 1649, 1654 (2001); Margaret A. McKean, Success
on the Commons: A Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource
Management, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 247 (1992).
61. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 43–45.
62. See, e.g, Kreps, 1990; North and Weingast, 1989; Williamson, 1983. In fact, and by
no means coincidentally, Williamson was given the other half of the 2009 Nobel Prize in
Economics for his scholarly contribution, which in large part is devoted to exploring the
concept of credible commitments. See Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis, supra note 18.
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outset who has rights 63 to what 64 and where. 65 A second example is
the principle that commons users should have the ability to
participate meaningfully in the governance in the commons. 66 It
makes sense that this would help because we are asking commons
users to trust that the promises made at the outset ultimately come
to fruition.
Providing credible commitments in the commons is often
difficult because when it comes to cutting back in the commons,
“temptations to free-ride and shirk are ever present.” 67 Without
credible commitments, it makes sense that users of a commons are
squeamish to cut back. As a perceptive federal judge observed more
than one hundred years ago, “no person would engage in [labor in
the commons] if the fruits of his labor could be appropriated by any
chance finder.” 68 Scholars of the commons have recognized that
without credible commitments, any conservation only leaves more
for others, making them a “sucker” 69 or a “patsy.” 70
A second theme that binds many of the factors that make a
difference in warding off the tragedy of the commons is that they
attempt to provide credible threats aimed at those tempted to
circumvent the rules of the game. Credible threats are just the flip
side of the coin used to make credible commitments. Just as is the
case with credible commitments, there is a rich literature that
explores credible threats. 71

63. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 91; McKean, supra note 60, at 258, 263;. WADE,
supra note 60, at 215; Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654.
64. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 91–92; McKean, supra note 60, at 264–66.
65. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 91–92; WADE, supra note 60, at 215; BALAND &
PLATTEAU, supra note 60, at 344; Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654.
66. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 93–94; BALAND & PLATTEAU, supra note 60, at 344;
Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654
67. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 15.
68. Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 162 (D. Mass. 1881).
69. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 17, 35 (citing fears of being the “sucker”).
70. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 242 (“Because no one can bind anyone else’s
actions, not consuming simply makes one a patsy.”).
71. See THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). Schelling’s
contribution to the literature on credible threats is in large part why he also won a Nobel Prize
in economics. The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis, The Prize in Economic Sciences 2005—Robert
Aumann’s and Thomas Schelling’s Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and
PRIZE
3
(Oct.
10,
2005),
available
at
Cooperation,
NOBEL
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2005/advanced-
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The need for compliance and the importance of excluding those
without rights are themes that run through the principles scholars
have identified. It is not surprising that some of the principles
include making monitoring as easy as possible and devoting
resources to ensure monitoring is effective, 72 escalate sanctions, 73 and
set out the rules of dispute resolution. 74 If consequences do not
follow the violation of any commitment made in the commons, it is
hard to say how we could call such a promise “credible”; credible
threats are part and parcel of making commitments. 75
The third thread that runs through these factors is the value of
low transaction costs in securing cooperation in the commons. The
importance of transaction costs in determining the success of
collective action is well documented. 76 Note that some of the factors
identified by commons scholars are matters of institutional design
and within the grasp of those attempting to govern the commons to
change. Examples include the use of nested enterprises within large
and complex commons resources 77 and giving resource users
management responsibilities over the commons. 78 Some other
factors are just a reflection that the situation in some commons
resources is more optimal than in others for reasons generally
difficult to foster. Smaller resources are easier to manage than larger
economicsciences2005.pdf. See also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION,
(Basic Books rev. ed. 2006); ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT
(1991); Wolfgang Leininger, Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations: The Dollar
Auction Revisited, 33 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 231 (1989).
72. See BALAND & PLATTEAU, supra note 60, at 345; OSTROM, supra note 3, at 94;
McKean supra note 60, at 272–74.
73. See BALAND & PLATTEAU, supra note 60, at 345; OSTROM, supra note 3, at 94–
100; Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654; McKean, supra note 60, at 275.
74. See BALAND & PLATTEAU, supra note 60, at 375; OSTROM, supra note 3, at 100–
01; Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654.
75. See SCHELLING, supra note 71, at 43 (“Among the legal privileges of corporations,
two that are mentioned in textbooks are the right to sue and the ‘right’ to be sued. Who wants
to be sued! But the right to be sued is the power to make a promise: to borrow money, to
enter a contract, to do business with someone who might be damaged. If suit does arise, the
‘right’ seems a liability in retrospect; beforehand it was a prerequisite to doing business.”).
76. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (using
transaction costs to explain the reason why interests of small, concentrated interests can often
outmaneuver larger groups that stand to reap more diffuse benefits).
77. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 101–02; Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654.
78. See McKean, supra note 60, at 258–61; Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654; McKean,
supra note 60, at 258–61.
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resources. 79 It helps when these are part of a tight-knit community
or the commons users at least have a shared set of values. 80
While one may take a more nuanced view of these principles, as
the many principles discussed above illustrate, these three categories
are useful not only because they encapsulate all of the principles, but
also because they provide a rationale for why factors of successful
commons are factors in the first place. Credible commitments and
threats help commons users meet the challenges posed by the
tragedy of the commons; they work together to assure that sacrifices
made by users today will benefit them specifically in the future and
not just another user of the commons. Coordination of collective
action helps promote cooperation in a circumstance where many
would be tempted to free ride. They also reduce the costs of users
governing a commons in the first place.
While the literature places the role of these principles in a very
optimistic light, credible commitments and threats along with
reduced collective action costs not only provide stability but also risk
introducing entrenchment. While these principles certainly provide
an answer to the tragedy of the commons, they also create problems
in themselves by creating barriers for those committed to extract
rival values from the commons. Solving the tragedy of the commons
does little to address the foreseeable conflicts among competing
uses. More and more, fights in the commons concern not only the
problem of overconsumption by a particular kind of user, but also
the push and pull of entirely different competing uses.
Whenever we commit to manage a commons for the benefit of a
particular set of users, we often lock out potential rivals and make
change more costly. In this way, stability can become rigidity. I have
argued in the past that just as the tragedy of the commons
continually crops up in diverse commons, the problem of competing
uses continues to reappear. 81 Because commons resources are
complex and can be used for many purposes, it is typical that when
we attempt to solve a problem in the commons, we find that laws

79. See WADE, supra note 60, at 215; Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654.
80. See BALAND & PLATTEAU, supra note 60, at 344–45; WADE, supra note 60, at 215;
Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654.
81. Daniels, supra note 31, at 522.
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and policies put in place to solve past problems complicate our
efforts and may in fact be the very source of our frustrations. 82
Managers of the commons are well acquainted with attempts to
push the commons in one direction or pull it in another. Should we
protect owl habitat or allow loggers to cut down trees? Should our
sidewalks be open to vendors, reserved for walkers, or a place for the
homeless to sleep? Should coastal wetlands be drained for
development, protected for wildlife, or valued for flood control? The
number of competing pressures vying for the commons within our
forests, rivers, cityscapes, the radio spectrum, and even the global
atmosphere highlight such tensions.
The problem of competing uses of the commons is not as simple
as it appears. There is more going on than an us-against-them
problem. The nature of the commons actually lends itself not only to
competing values but also entrenched interests. Very often, when we
try to solve a tragedy of the commons, we not only address a
problem but make a commitment to value a commons in a certain
way: forests are for logging; sidewalks are available for vendors to
use; wetlands are for wildlife. Whenever we commit to manage a
commons for the benefit of a particular set of users, we often lock
out potential rivals and make change more difficult. In this way, the
stability that Ostrom’s long-enduring institutions celebrate for rival
users seems more like rigidity and barriers to change.
An example that highlights these concerns is the important role
and evolution of voluntary associations of irrigators in the arid
West. 83 Originally these irrigation systems were designed to promote
cooperation among many water users; water districts brought people
together and created rules to govern users long before legislatures
and courts even considered asserting government power in this
area. 84 In the 1800s, these water districts changed much of the West

82. Id.
83. Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, Irrigation Institutions in the American West, 25
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 283, 295–300 (2007) (discussing the history of local irrigation
associations in the western United States); Chris Bromley, A Political and Legal Analysis of the
Rise and Fall of Western Dams and Reclamation Projects, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 204,
206–16 (2001) (discussing the doctrine of prior appropriation and the monopolization of
water rights in the West).
84. Bresten & Hill, supra note 83.
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from uninhabitable deserts to locations where settlers could develop
towns and cities.
While irrigation companies depend on and continue to promote
cooperation among water users, they also have become a vehicle to
channel lobbying efforts designed to protect their water use rights
and otherwise maintain the status quo. 85 From the perspective of
incumbent water users, the need for a unified front has grown.
Today, the West is increasingly concerned with providing water to
burgeoning cities and more interested in using water to satisfy
environmental, esthetic, and recreational values. What we find is that
the methods that allowed for governance over a commons resource
in one era now serve to complicate governing the commons today.
In the commons, the seeds of conflict are often sown in the
accomplishments of the past.
CONCLUSION
While the stories we tell and retell about the commons have
elements of tragedy and of comedy, it turns out that these stories
have elements that tie them together and that often we find elements
of tragedy and comedy coexisting. On one hand, we find that
commons resources are plagued with challenges, most of which can
be traced back to the internal characteristics of the commons—the
nature of the resource, the traits of its users, the way the commons is
governed, and the value placed on the commons resource. At the
same time, we find that through governance there is at least hope
that we can overcome these internal challenges and this inertia. Even
though the storyline is very difficult to alter, it is ours to write.

85. See generally Janis M. Carey & David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A
Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Central Valley and Colorado-Big Thompson Projects,
41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 303–14 (2001).
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